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THE BANKRUPTCY FIRM

VINCENT S.J. BUCCOLA †
INTRODUCTION
Bankruptcy scholars spend too much time thinking about distributional
norms and not enough assessing the impact of bankruptcy rules on the quality of
governance in Chapter 11. That, in short, is the thesis of The Bankruptcy Partition,
the contribution of Professors Baird, Casey, and Picker to this symposium. 1 Of
course, the authors being who they are, the Article is about much, much more.
This brief response seeks to draw out some of the article’s themes and, in the last
Part, to suggest an approach to thinking about the nature of the bankrupt firm
that could deepen and extend a conversation the authors usefully begin.
I. THE ROLE OF THE FIRM IN BANKRUPTCY
The Bankruptcy Partition flows from a simple premise—that reorganization law
seeks (or in any case should seek) to maximize the value of the bankrupt firm. 2 It
sounds like a consensus statement of purpose, but in fact it is not so obvious. This
is because firm-value maximization is posited in contrast to another plausible
norm with which it is often (mistakenly) elided—that of investor-wealth
maximization. In a frictionless world, these two norms have identical content.
But in the real world, as the authors point out, maximizing firm value often
means not maximizing investor wealth. 3 More specifically, a focus on firm value
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1 Douglas G. Baird, Anthony J. Casey & Randal C. Picker, The Bankruptcy Partition, 166 U. PA.
L. REV. 1675 (2018). It is also the point of departure of Professor Rasmussen’s contribution. See generally
Robert K. Rasmussen, Taking Control Rights Seriously, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 1749 (2018).
2 Baird, Casey & Picker, supra note 1, at 1679.
3 Id. at 1682. (“The focus, however, is upon maximizing the value of the estate, not on the total return

to creditors as a group.”); Id. at 1683 (“The proper focus is entirely on what goes to creditors on account of
their claims against the estate.”).
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implies that bankruptcy decision processes should, insofar as possible, ignore the
effects of firm activity on the value of investors’ “outside” investments. 4
To illustrate the contrast between the competing norms, suppose a debtor is
looking to sell a factory under § 363. 5 Two potential buyers emerge. One is an
existing creditor of the debtor; the other, a stranger. And suppose further that the
creditor–-bidder will benefit immensely by acquiring the factory, but, because of
liquidity constraints, can afford to pay slightly less than the stranger can. If the
aim of bankruptcy were to maximize investor wealth, then this creditor-bidder’s
plight would matter to the decision calculus. It might make sense to channel the
assets his way, even though doing so would promise to reduce other investors’
recoveries, because his gains could exceed the sum of the others’ losses. Not so
under a firm-value maximization norm. Where firm value is the aim, top dollar
for the seller is all that counts.
As this example suggests, to assert the firm-value norm is to advocate a
conflict resolution process destined to allocate resources inefficiently (viewed ex
post). If firm-value maximization is desirable, it is due to the norm’s offsetting,
salutary effects on ex ante investment decisionmaking. Among other things, a
focus on firm value, like the rule of limited liability, helps to make investment
interests fungible and so opens up secondary markets. And so one’s investment
in a firm typically carries with it the implicit agreement that one’s private
interests other than those embodied in the investment contract itself will be
excluded from management’s decision calculus. 6 The logic has been central to the
literature on asset partitioning for decades. 7 If its implications are striking in this
4 I’ll return in Part III to the question of what, in the article’s scheme, distinguishes an asset of the
firm from an asset held outside the firm. For now, think of outside assets as the set of investors’ legal rights
other than those that are obligations of the debtor. Because by accounting, identity assets equal liabilities
plus equity, saying that bankruptcy should maximize the value of a firm’s assets is equivalent to saying
bankruptcy should maximize the total returns on all of the firm’s securities and other legal obligations. The
size of returns on other investments—which is to say, investors’ outside assets—is irrelevant under this
scheme. Thus, unless the value of “outside” assets is positively related to the value of firm assets in a
particular case, outcomes under a firm-value and an investor-wealth rule of decision will diverge.
5 See 11 U.S.C. § 363(b) (2012) (authorizing, with judicial consent, the use or sale of debtor
property outside the ordinary course of business).
6 In her contribution to this symposium, Professor Jacoby calls attention to another defect of the
investor-wealth maximization norm—namely, its tendency in practice, if not theory, to disregard the
interests of constituents with relatively little voice. Melissa B. Jacoby, Corporate Bankruptcy Hybridity, 166
U. PA. L. REV. 1715,1730-31 (2018).
7 See, e.g., Kenneth Ayotte & Henry Hansmann, Legal Entities as Transferable Bundles of Contracts, 111
MICH. L. REV. 715, 748 (2013); Douglas G. Baird & Anthony J. Casey, No Exit? Withdrawal Rights and the
Law of Corporate Reorganizations, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (2013); Anthony J. Casey, The New Corporate
Web: Tailored Entity Partitions and Creditors’ Selective Enforcement, 124 YALE L.J. 2680, 2683-84 (2015); Henry
Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110 YALE L.J. 387, 390 (2000);
Edward M. Iacobucci & George G. Triantis, Economic and Legal Boundaries of Firms, 93 VA. L. REV. 515,
517-18 (2007); George G. Triantis, Organizations as Internal Capital Markets: The Legal Boundaries of Firms,
Collateral, and Trusts in Commercial and Charitable Enterprises, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1102, 1104 (2004).
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context, it is only because bankruptcy scholarship and case law have seldom taken
seriously the distinction between a firm’s value and the aggregate creditor
recovery its reorganization produces. 8 The Bankruptcy Partition does a valuable
service in bringing this distinction to the surface.
In any case, the firm-value maximization norm does a lot of work in the
article. One thing it does is to analytically decompose the creditors’ bargain.
Bankruptcy law, under the authors’ approach, is implicitly modeled as having
three distinctive functions: first, to define a “firm”; second, to charge the
bankruptcy court with the task of maximizing the value of that firm, and to give
it the tools necessary to do so; and third, to distribute claims on the reorganized
firm. The authors set aside this third step—distribution—and focus on the first
two functions, to which I will now turn, in reverse order.
II. INFORMATION PRODUCTION
A major aim of The Bankruptcy Partition is to persuade readers that the
imperative to maximize firm value animates much of what is most interesting
in reorganization law today. The article thus seeks to reorient debate about
controversial practices, away from questions of cash flow rights (or distribution)
and toward the design of control and influence rights. And the article makes a
strong case that a number of features of reorganization practice are best judged
by their capacity to produce reliable information about the effect of a proposed
action on firm value rather than investor wealth—what the authors call
“policing” the partition.
The intuition is developed mainly with examples. Thus, for instance,
critical vendor orders and roll-ups are assessed according to their expected
effect on firm value rather than their aberrant tendency to violate distributional
norms. 9 The article’s practical conclusions on these topics are not inconsistent
with leading authorities, such as In re Kmart. 10 To the extent paying a
prepetition claim in full is likely to increase the debtor’s value, doing so is
presumptively proper. 11 But the article’s approach helps to explain where and
why bankruptcy judges should be skeptical about payments to some prepetition
creditors more than others.
8 For a more general evaluation of the tradeoff between ex ante and ex post efficiency in
bankruptcy, see David A. Skeel, Jr. & George Triantis, Bankruptcy’s Uneasy Shift to a Contract Paradigm,
166 U. PA. L. REV. 1777 (2018).
9 Baird, Casey & Picker, supra note 1, at 1705-14.
10 In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d 866 (7th Cir. 2004).
11 A puzzle The Bankruptcy Partition exposes but which it does not seek to resolve is why debtors in
possession should have flexibility to pay prepetition creditors during the pendency of a bankruptcy but not
through a plan of reorganization. More generally, why might a bankruptcy judge’s application of discretion
be expected to maximize firm value in the early days of bankruptcy but not at its end? For a speculative
explanation, see Vincent S.J. Buccola, The Janus Faces of Reorganization Law, 44 J. CORP. L. 1, 27-28 (2018).
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To maximize firm value, the bankruptcy judge needs tools to harness
investors’ private information and check their self-interest. A number of
discretionary powers are explained instrumentally along these lines. To take just
one of the authors’ examples, consider the power to designate votes cast in bad
faith. There is general agreement that it is proper to designate the vote of a
creditor holding a large short interest—to prevent the creditor from willfully
tanking the debtor. 12 Without recourse to the firm-value maximization objective,
however, this intuition and the designation power itself are hard to square with
ordinary norms of commercial self-interest.
By focusing on this idea—that a judge’s goal is to maximize firm value and not
creditors’ total returns—The Bankruptcy Partition helps to explain and unify what
otherwise might seem to be puzzling or unrelated features of reorganization law.
The judge wants to maximize the value of the firm, but the investors, who exert
influence over the ultimate disposition of the estate’s assets, each seek to maximize
their respective private returns. The imperfect correlation between firm value and
investors’ total returns causes problems. Of course, we have long understood that
conflict in bankruptcy naturally results from the hierarchical nature of investors’
claims. Neither the fully secured senior lender nor the underwater junior interest
wants strictly to maximize firm value, and bankruptcy supplies a means to
adjudicate their disagreement. A significant contribution of the article is to
highlight the ways bankruptcy law must also, and for the same reason, take account
of creditor interests altogether outside the bankruptcy. The more likely it is that
the value of an investor’s outside investments are inversely related to the value of
the bankrupt firm, the more skeptically the judge must view that investor’s
influence over the debtor in possession and, eventually, plan confirmation.
III. DEFINING THE FIRM IN BANKRUPTCY
Let me turn now to the antecedent issue I have so far bracketed: what exactly
is this firm (or what should it be) whose value the bankruptcy process is meant
to maximize? 13 The article answers this question—what defines the firm in
bankruptcy?—by introducing a new analytical construct: the bankruptcy
partition. The authors do not explicitly define the partition, so I will take the
liberty of interpretation. The bankruptcy partition describes a pool of assets over
which the trustee and bankruptcy judge have, or may assert, control rights. This
12 Baird, Casey & Picker, supra note 1, at 1695-96. See also 11 U.S.C. § 1126(e) (2012) (“On request of
a party in interest, and after notice and a hearing, the court may designate any entity whose acceptance or
rejection of such plan was not in good faith, or was not solicited or procured in good faith or in accordance
with the provisions of this title.”).
13 Note that this question arises only under the firm-value maximization norm and not under the
investor-wealth maximization norm. That is, we care what counts as “the firm” only if the boundary itself
supplies reasons for acting in certain ways, which it does not do under a general wealth-maximization norm.
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pool of assets is closely related to, but not identical with and systematically
greater than, the assets that would belong to the debtor firm outside bankruptcy
in a counterfactual world where no petition for relief was filed. For the authors,
it is this broader, bankruptcy-specific set of assets whose joint value
reorganization law should seek to maximize.
Inside the partition lies, first, the entirety of the statutorily defined
“estate”—roughly speaking, all of the inventory, equipment, leases, contracts,
and so on, that the debtor held before bankruptcy—and, second, all property
held by others but subject to the trustee’s avoidance powers.14 So far, so good.
Think what one will about the avoidance powers as a normative matter; at least
one can agree that under existing law they in fact bring assets within the control
of the trustee and court.
Additional items that lie inside the partition warrant further discussion.15 Some
of these additional items are brought within the bankruptcy partition as a matter
of course in every case. The security interest is a prime example. 16 Under ordinary
principles of commercial law, the security interest allows a lender to foreclose on
collateral upon the debtor’s default. A major function of the automatic stay,
however, is to divest secured lenders of this very right.17 The stay can thus be recast
as a transfer of state-contingent control rights over the collateral from the lender to
the trustee. In the article’s idiom, bankruptcy sweeps the security interest inside
the partition. To be sure, the law protects the lender’s distributional interest by
requiring that she be adequately protected during the bankruptcy and that she
receive the “indubitable equivalent” of her secured claim under a plan of
reorganization.18 But the law also invests the trustee and the court with control of
the foreclosure right, and consequently it is within the pool of assets whose value
bankruptcy ought, in the authors’ view, to maximize.19
14 See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2012) (describing the estate); Id. §§ 544–45, 547–49 (enumerating
the trustee’s avoidance powers).
15 The authors distinguish municipal bankruptcy, saying that deviations from joint-value
maximization there are more acceptable, on the ground that Chapter 9 does not create an estate. Baird,
Casey & Picker, supra note 1, at 1713. It is an accurate description of the law, but the existence of a statutory
estate is neither here nor there under the article’s schema. What matters for the schema is the authors’
analytical construct, the partition, and not the “estate” with which bankruptcy lawyers are familiar. The
better explanation of the uneven distributions in Detroit’s bankruptcy, to which the authors refer, is
Chapter 9’s “legislative” character. See generally Vincent S.J. Buccola, Law and Legislation in Municipal
Bankruptcy, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 1301 (2017).
16 Baird, Casey & Picker, supra note 1, at 1684.
17 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2012).
18 Id. § 362(d)(adequate protection); § 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii) (indubitable equivalent).
19 Note that, as a descriptive matter, it is not clear that bankruptcy judges are to jointly maximize the
value of security interests and property belonging formally to the estate. If the debtor cannot adequately
protect the value of the creditor’s secured claim, the court is to allow repossession under 11 U.S.C.
§ 362(d)—even where doing so fails to maximize joint value. As a descriptive matter, security interests
might more accurately be imagined as constraints on the firm-value maximization norm.
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Other items seem to come inside the partition selectively, by assertion of
judicial authority. An example—about which the authors are ambivalent—is a
cause of action belonging to one or more of a debtor’s creditors against a third
party.20 This is the familiar problem of the third-party release. 21 Its descriptive
logic parallels that of the security interest. A judge who enjoins creditor litigation
or compromises a creditor’s claim effectively brings that claim inside the
partition—she asserts control of it—and should therefore seek to maximize its
value alongside the debtor’s other assets.
But should a bankruptcy court have control over creditors’ claims in the first
place? The article acknowledges the case against third-party releases, especially
where the claims to be released belong (outside bankruptcy) to only one or a
minority of creditors.22 But the article also credits third-party releases with the
capacity to achieve what it calls “global peace” where collective-action dynamics
might otherwise overwhelm. 23 And the authors point out that a rule of full
compensation for those whose nonbankruptcy rights are compromised can, at
least in principle, eliminate the prospect of strategic “commandeering.”24 On
balance, at least on my reading, the authors seem to be moderate supporters of
a third-party release power.
But on what principle? How is the partition to be defined? What, in other
words, distinguishes the assets that bankruptcy should “bring inside” the
partition from those that should remain under the control of their
nonbankruptcy owners? The article discusses “bankruptcy purposes,” but it
could be more explicit about what those are. Indeed, if I have a complaint about
the article, it is the lack of a limiting principle on the bankruptcy partition’s
scope. The problem is this: any time one asset’s disposition could affect the value
of an asset belonging to the debtor, there is, under the authors’ mode of
analysis, at least a prima facie case for bringing the outside asset inside the
partition. This is because there is always a chance that a Pareto-efficient
trade—across the partition, so to speak—will fail to materialize if the court
does not assert control over both assets concurrently. As soon as three parties
See Baird, Casey & Picker, supra note 1, at 1687-90 (discussing third-party releases).
Compare, e.g., Resorts Int’l, Inc. v. Lowenschuss (In re Lowenschuss), 67 F.3d 1394, 1402 (9th Cir.
1995) (holding that § 524(e) of the Code prohibits third-party releases), with MacArthur Co. v. JohnsManville Corp., 837 F.2d 89, 90 (2d Cir. 1988) (affirming the bankruptcy court’s release of some of the
debtor’s insurers from future litigation).
22 Baird, Casey & Picker, supra note 1, at 1687-88.
23 Id. at 1688.
24 Id. In this sense, the article’s analysis of third-party releases looks much like its analysis of the
security interest. Cf. id. at 1684 (“[T]he requirement that the secured creditor be given the indubitable
equivalent of its collateral ensures that the partition is not shifted simply to give general creditors value that
they could not enjoy outside of bankruptcy.”). Indeed, compensation might be a constitutional requirement
under the Takings Clause. Cf. Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 601-02 (1935)
(holding that mortgagee’s interest is property interest within the meaning of the Takings Clause).
20
21
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are involved, there is always a collective-action problem to be solved, always
a “global peace” to be brokered.
The authors are the people who taught me Coase, so I am sure they
recognize my challenge as a restatement of the question underlying his 1937
paper. 25 Coase supplies the general answer, too: the limit on the partition’s
scope is the price of knowledge.
How, in particular, does this limit manifest? As the authors point out, the act
of bringing an asset inside the partition will have a redistributive tinge and so
will provoke strategic reaction unless the person whose control rights are to be
nullified is fully compensated26—hence the “indubitable equivalent” rule
discussed above. But compensation requires an appraisal of the asset’s value.
Valuing collateral on a lift-stay motion is hard enough, even with a number of
market checks often being available. How much more appraisal should one wish
for? I don’t know. But I do know that if one ignores the informational burden
courts face in valuing assets and the error costs valuation generates, one cannot
define an upper bound to the size of the bankruptcy firm. In this sense, the
appropriate scope of the firm in bankruptcy is intimately bound up with, and
can’t be separated from, the effectiveness of the information-forcing
mechanisms at the bankruptcy judge’s disposal—the effectiveness of the rules
used to “police the partition.” Other things being equal, the more effectively a
judge can induce investors to reveal their private valuations, the more extensive
her control rights should be.
The Goldilocks maxim once again yields the optimal solution. The bankruptcy
partition should be not too big and not too small. But what concretely does this
entail? The place to start is with the firm that investors in fact constituted outside
bankruptcy. Solvent firms, like the bankruptcy partition, exist to ameliorate
opportunistic behavior endemic in disintegrated markets, and solvent firms, too,
are limited in scope by information problems. Markets work, however imperfectly,
to locate a balance. Control rights over most asset classes are easy to assign, even
on a state-contingent basis, so the burden is on the one who wants to shift control
rights in bankruptcy to show (1) why the bankruptcy decision process is apt to do a
better job valuing the relevant asset class than the parties could do ex ante and (2),
if bankruptcy is better at valuation, what kind of contracting failure would have
prevented investors from replicating its decision process in flush times.
My suggested approach to defining the partition points to a minimal
bankruptcy regime because its logic applies with equal force to the secured
R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937).
The proceeds of a transfer avoided under §§ 544(b) or 548 are shared by all creditors of the
debtor, not only the creditors entitled to avoid the transfer under state law. See Baird, Casey & Picker,
supra note 1, at 1685 n.27. This asymmetry has long bothered commentators. See, e.g., Vincent S.J.
Buccola, Beyond Insolvency, 62 KAN. L. REV. 1, 35 n.99 (2013). But the authors are probably right to
say the sharing rule does rough justice in most cases.
25
26
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creditor’s foreclosure rights. But let me conclude by proposing a principle, in
need of future elaboration, that is roughly consistent with existing law. The
bankruptcy partition should embrace two and only two kinds of assets—those
that belong to the debtor outside bankruptcy and those that would belong to the
debtor outside bankruptcy but for its financial distress. The first category is
straightforward. The second category would include, for example, a secured
lender’s foreclosure rights (which are activated only by default), as well as
property transferred preferentially or fraudulently (which typically would not
have been transferred but for financial distress). The third-party release power
does not make the cut, however, because a bankruptcy court doesn’t sit to resolve
all collective-action problems. The optimal amount of opportunism, in
bankruptcy and out, is greater than zero.
CONCLUSION
The Bankruptcy Partition is framed around the claim that scholars spill too
much ink on arguments about bankruptcy’s distributional rules. I doubt whether
that case has been proved. If nothing else, investors’ distributional expectations
affect their propensity to generate and disclose information about the debtor’s
prospects, which must in turn influence the efficacy of the rules for “policing the
partition.” But ultimately the article’s contribution, which is substantial, has
nothing to do with its nominal thesis. Its contribution is to identify and provoke
research on the interdependency of three functions of bankruptcy law—deciding
which assets are subject to bankruptcy’s decision processes; preventing investors’
interests in other, outside assets from coloring bankruptcy decisionmaking; and
distributing value among the investors. More can, should, and will be said about
each function. A major lesson of this paper is that changing the settings on one
function is bound to impact the performance of the others.
_______________________________________________________________
Preferred Citation: Vincent S.J. Buccola, The Bankruptcy Firm, 167 U. PA.
L. REV. ONLINE 1 (2019), http://www.pennlawreview.com/online/167-U-Pa-LRev-Online-1.pdf.

